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Ottoman studies in the West other than diplomatic have concentrated on the nineteenth century. Recent studies of the eighteenth century Ottoman Empire indicate that the malady which afflicted the "sick man of Europe" predates the time that the "Eastern Question" preoccupied European diplomatists. Within the Ottoman Empire Istanbul was a microcosm of the complex interplay of Christian (Armenian, Greek, and European), Jewish and Muslim groups during a period of political disorder and decline. During this time of internal rebellion and war these groups attempted to define their identities and priorities-racial, religious, political or financial, while forging new alliances with the Sultanate and ruling groups. I have indicated in previous studies *that emerging alliances were not necessarily along millet (religio-national) lines. Economic groupings superseded traditional allegiances. In my opinion an understanding of the period under consideration is essential to an understanding of the nationalistic movements of the nineteenth century and the accompanying problems of modernization which persist even today in the Middle East.
Between the height of the price revolution in the middle sixteenth century and the first half of the eighteenth century monumental changes had taken place in Europe. As Professor Braudel put it, a "new sharp toothed capitalism" had come into being with accompanying manifestations from internal capitalistic developments to the expansion of Europe into other lands. This was not true of the Ottoman Empire. When the effects of the price revolution began to abate in Europe around 1650, the shattered economy of the Ottoman Empire could not withstand the onslaught of European capitalism which undermined its abilities to industrialize. The "underdevelopment" of the Ottoman Empire and of the Middle East had begun. In these circumstances the silk and spice trade became all the more important as well as a competitive source of revenue for the Ottomans and the Persians whose economies were increasingly in the backwater of world trade and commerce. Yet in the first half of the eighteenth century both countries were sustaining huge empires; while the Ottoman Empire had been reduced as a result of treaties with Europe, the Persian Empire was experiencing an expansion.
The Ottomans and the Persians could not, however, reconcile their imperial ambitions with their medieval economies. Because of their inability to confront the Europeans successfully, the Ottomans gradually lowered their imperial gaze in Europe, but they did not do so in the east where they sought aggrandizement at the expense of the Persians. Nadir Shah, the emperor of Persia, also pursued a policy of imperial expansion at great expense to his subjects. The quarter of a century of wars ( Everard Fawkener, the British Ambassador at the Porte, thought that the hatt-i hiimayun (Sultanic Decree) which ordered all shopkeepers to keep their shops open during a rebellion was a remarkable proclamation in that the shopkeepers were also commanded to take up arms and to attack the insurgents on threat of being hanged from their own shopdoors. On June 9 there was another flare-up, but before it could gather momentum it was suppressed by the people in the neighborhood (mahalle) where it occurred. The people fell upon the rebels and "knocked on the Head the Mutineers as they were directed" by the hatt-i humayun which had called for the retaliation on the part of the esnaf who had been armed for this purpose. There were those in Istanbul who were of the opinion that the June 9 outbreak was not for the purpose of a general uprising of the people, but rather only a quarrel among Janissaries. But the suppression of it by the esnaf and people of the neighborhood could have given great offense to the Janissaries. According to Fawkener, the retaliation on the part of the esnaf was detested by the Janissaries and it made the hatt-l hiimayun seem ill judged, for now the esnaf -many of whom were Christians and Jews-were called upon to take arms against the Janissaries. Fawkener was of the opinion that an interference of this type could lead to a "general Massacre of those people (which) may one day very easily be the effect of it, as well as what further Mischief may be apprehended from the Militia's being got together in arms, & fearing in punishment of it". This, indeed, is a striking and highly significant passage.
The fact that the arming of the non-Muslims corresponded with the inauguration of extensive capitulations to France (1740) which insured even greater advantages to the millets in the subsequent years was to further exacerbate tensions between the Muslim and non-Muslim communities. The alliance of the Sultan and the nonMuslim bourgeoisie was, however, a double-edged sword. The millets were to prosper in the latter part of the eighteenth century but only with the favor of the Sultan. The Sultan, in effect, held the millets, especially after 1740, as captives. In future if the millets did not acquiesce to his policies, the Sultan would be able to turn the discontent of the crowds on them. For unlike the social revolution of Patrona Halil, after 1730 the resentment of the Muslim masses could be turned more effectively against the millets. The millets, in turn, could only escape from this bind by nationalistic expressions which emerged in due course during the first quarter of the nineteenth century. But the alignement of forces which produced rebellion and social upheaval in 1730-31 was not to be resurrected, largely due to the Sultan's policy of 1740. The legacy of 1740 was increased tension between Muslim and non-Muslim which prohibited reform and modernization in the later eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
